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Casenote
Black and White Make Gray:
Common Cause v. Kemp, What's the
Trigger for Purging Voters?*
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine showing up to the voting poll, eager to vote and to show
support for a candidate, and waiting in a long line, possibly in the cold.
Then imagine handing your identification over only to be told you were
not on the voter registration roll. This is what happened to 100,000 voters
in the 2016 presidential primary election when they were purged from
the voter registration rolls. Because of the voter purging, they were
unable to cast their vote in a controversial and close election.' ABC News
reported many voters who were removed from voting registration rolls
were from low-income neighborhoods or neighborhoods that tended to
vote Democratic. 2 The New York Times referred to purging statutes as a
"malicious pattern" sweeping the country.3 The question in Common

.

* The Author wishes to express her heartfelt thanks to Professor Sue
Painter-Thorne at Mercer Law School for her patience, encouragement, and input
throughout the drafting and editing process. Additionally, the Author wishes to express
gratitude to all Mercer Law Review members who provided their input and help throughout
the editing process. Lastly, the Author wishes to express gratitude to her family and fianc6
for their constant support, guidance, and love.
1. Brigid Bergin & Jenny Ye, A Year After Brooklyn Voter Purge Scandal, a Timeline
for Action and Inaction, WNYC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.wnyc.org/story/yearafter-brooklyn-voter-purge-timeline-action-inaction/.
2. Jennifer Hansler, Federal Court Rules Ohio's Voter Purge Unconstitutional,ABC
NEWS (Sept. 25, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/federal-court-rules-ohios-voterpurge-unconstitutional/story?id=42343068.
3. Vanita Gupta, The Voter Purges Are Coming, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2017), https:
3
//www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/opinion/donald-trump-voting-rights-purge.html?mcubz=
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Cause v. Kemp 4 is whether this is a malicious pattern stripping voters of
federal protection or a state's right of protecting the integrity of the
voting system.
Recently, voters have filed suits claiming states' voter purge statutes
violate the 1993 National Voter Registration Act (NVRA).5 However,
there is a dearth of precedent that provides guidance on the trigger
provision in the NVRA.6 The trigger provision in the NVRA gives states
the right to remove voters in order to decrease voter fraud by using the
identity of the deceased or a non-resident only after providing notice.7
This provision, however, has created disputes regarding the silence and
whether abstaining from voting can be a trigger. Courts differ on how to
interpret the silence of the trigger provision in the NVRA. Common
Cause differs from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in its opinion of what the silence of the NVRA conveys about the
trigger provision.8 Congress believed it created a black and white law
that provided safeguards for the right not to vote and balanced the
interests of the state. These black and white lines of the statute bled
together when states began to interpret it.9 It is now gray, and the
Supreme Court of the United States or Congress will have to try and
draw the lines again. However, for now, it is important for Georgia voters
to recognize they have a right not to vote, but if a voter confirmation
notice comes in the mail, a reply is necessary to remain on the voter
registration rolls.10
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On February 10, 2016, Common Cause and. the Georgia State
Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) filed suit against Georgia's Secretary of State, Brian
Kemp, in his official capacity and personally. The two non-profit
organizations claimed the removal procedure under Section 21-2-234 of

the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)11 violated the NVRA,
4. 243 F. Supp. 3d 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2017), vacated and remanded, 714 F. App'x 990
(11th Cir. 2018) (vacating the district court's order of dismissal and remanding to consider
the Supreme Court of the United States' pending opinion in A. Philip Randolph Inst. v.
Husted, 838 F.3d 699 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2188 (2017) (argued Jan. 10,
2018)).
5. National Voting Rights Act of 1993, 103 Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993).
6. A. PhilipRandolph Inst., 243 F. Supp. 3d at 1320.
7. 103 Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77.
8. See cases cited infra Part III.
9. See statutes cited infra Part III.
10. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234 (2017).
11. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234 (2017).
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3
Help America Vote Act (HAVA),1 2 and the First Amendment right of
14
eligible voters who chose not to vote.
Georgia enacted the voter purge statute, O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234, in
1994.15 In 1997, Georgia amended the section regarding voter removal
16
procedures and enacted the language at issue in Common Cause. The
change was subjected to the Department of Justice for preclearance
under the 1964 Voting Rights Act.17 The Department of Justice approved
the changes made to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234, concluding it did not violate
section five of the Voting Rights Act. 18
In Common Cause, the United States submitted a statement of
interest to the court that said, "The United States sides with [Common
Cause and the NAACP] and argues that the voter-removal program
violates federal voting-rights laws." 19 Georgia's Secretary of State Brian
Kemp argued that the residency confirmation cards are not triggered by
a voter not voting, but instead, by a voter's failure to have any contact
20
with election officials for three years.
Common Cause and the NAACP contended that the removal of a voter
for failure to vote violates citizens' First Amendment right not to
participate in the electoral process. They further argued that O.C.G.A.
§ 21-2-234 violates the NVRA because the trigger provision to receive a
confirmation card was the failure to vote. Further, they contended the
voting removal procedure did not apply to the entire jurisdiction, but
rather, only applied to voters who had not voted in the past three years.
Lastly, Common Cause and the NAACP argued that because Georgia's
removal statute considers the voting history of voters, the ultimate cause
of the removal will have been the failure to vote, which violates the
NVRA. 21 The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia ultimately held that Georgia's purge statute did not infringe on
22
people's right to vote.

12. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. Common Cause, 243 F. Supp. 3d at 1317-18.
15. Ga. H.R. Bill 12017, Reg. Sess., 1994 Ga. Laws 1443 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 21-2234).
16. Ga. H.R. Bill 889, Reg. Sess., 1997 Ga. Laws 649 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
§ 21-2-234).
17. National Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
18. Common Cause, 243 F. Supp. 3d at 1317.
19. Id. at 1317-18.
20. Id. at 1320. "No contact" also includes a voter failing to sign a voter certificate,
which can only be signed at the voting polls. Id. at 1317.
21. Id. at 1321-22.
22. Id. at 1324.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Life Before Gray
Prior to the enactment of the NVRA, voters relied on common law to
protect them from being removed from voter registration lists solely for
not voting. The courts have continuously held that the right not to vote
is a First Amendment right under the United States Constitution. 23
Courts, however, differ on whether "voter purge" statutes violate this

right. 24 The 1993 NVRA provides protection to individuals from being
removed from voter registration lists solely based on not voting.25 At the
same time, it created a "safe harbor" provision for removing voters but
not for failure to vote. 26 The NVRA, as noted in Common Cause v. Kemp,
is silent regarding what can be the trigger for putting a voter on notice of
removal from the voter registration list.27

B. The Right Not to Vote-Can It Be Infringed Upon?
In 1972, the Michigan Supreme Court held in Michigan State UAW
Community Action Program Council v. Secretary of State 28 that a
Michigan purging statute was unconstitutional and should be suspended
from use. 29 In that case, Michigan State UAW Community Action
Program Council sued on behalf of themselves and other citizens affected
by Michigan's voter purge statute. 30 Section 168.509 of Michigan
Compiled Laws Annotated 31 provided:
During the month of December in each year, the clerk shall examine
the registration records and shall suspend the registration for all
electors who have not voted, continued their registration, reinstated
their registration, or recorded a change of address on their registration
within a period of 2 years. Each such elector shall be sent a notice ...
[that provides] [a]fter the expiration of 30 days, the clerk shall cancel

23. See, e.g., cases cited infra Part III.B.
24. Jeffery A. Blomberg, Protecting The Right Not to Vote From Voter Purge Statutes,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1015, 1021 (1995) ("[V]oter purge statutes remove an outlet for
political expression by preventing an individual from being counted among the reported
number of registered voters who choose not to vote in a given election.").
25. National Voting Rights Act of 1993 § 8, 103 Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993).
26. Id.
27. Common Cause, 243 F. Supp. 3d at 1320.
28. 387 Mich. 506 (1972).
29. Id. at 519.
30. Id. at 512.
31. MICH. COMP. LAws § 168.509 (2017).

2018]

COMMON CAUSE V. KEMP

951

the registration of all electors thus notified who [had] not applied for
continuations. 32
The court found that the removal of qualified citizens from voter
registration rolls-based on not voting-affected their right to vote as
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 33 According to the court,
34
if there is a right to vote, there must be a right not to vote as well.
Therefore, for a law to restrict the right to vote, the State must
35
demonstrate a compelling state interest for the restriction. The State
argued that removal from the registration roll was a small price to pay
36
in order to prevent abuse of the voting system. The court disagreed that
the prevention of voter fraud was a compelling state interest that
37
justified the limitation on the right to vote.
Contrary to Michigan State UAW Community Action Program
Council, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld
39
a voter purge statute. 38 In Hoffman v. Maryland, the court held in 1991
that Maryland's voter purge statute did not violate voters' First
40
Amendment right by removing them for not voting. The Maryland voter
purge statute provides that "registered voters who [had] not voted in the
last five years be removed from the rolls by cancellation of their
registration." 4 1 The plaintiffs, Thomas Hoffman and Timothy Ulrich,
alleged the five-year voter purge statute violated the First and
42
by
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
to
right
restricting eligible voters' right to vote and by burdening voters'
43
statute
purge
free speech. Hoffman and Ulrich were victims of the voter
after failing to vote since 1984.44
Under the Maryland statute, before removal of a voter from the roll, a
notice was sent to a voter's last known address informing the voter of the
32. Mich. State UAW Cmty. Action Program Council, 387 Mich. at 512 (quoting MICH.
COMP. LAws § 168.509).
33. Id. at 520.
34. Id. at 515 (quoting Beare v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 1100, 1102-03 (S.D. Tex. 1971)
("[T]he right to vote is a right which is at the heart of our system of government.
Parenthetically, it must be said that there is also a right not to vote.")).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 516.
Id.
Id. at 521.
Hoffman v. Maryland, 928 F.2d 646, 659 (4th Cir. 1991).
928 F.2d 646 (4th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 649.
Id. at 647.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 647.
Id.
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impending action of removal. 45 In its decision, the court recognized a
right not to vote just as much as there was a right to vote.46 However, the
court stated that Hoffman and Ulrich's right not to vote was not infringed
when they were removed from the voter registration list because they
could still choose not to vote regardless. 47 According to the court, the
statute was not designed to abridge free speech, but rather, to support a
governmental interest of preventing voter fraud.48 Further, the court was
concerned that "[wlithout removing the names, there exists the very real
danger that impostors will claim to be someone on the list and vote in
their

place." 49 The court

concluded

that "re-registration

may be

somewhat burdensome, [but] it is a small price to pay for the prevention
of vote fraud" and therefore, this small price compared to the government
interest sustained the statute as not infringing on Hoffman and Ulrich's
First Amendment right of free speech.5 0
C. Protecting the Right Not to Vote
In 1993, Congress enacted the National Voter Registration Act. 51
Generally, the NVRA prohibits the removal of voters based solely on their
failure to vote in elections. 52 However, the NVRA provides a safe-harbor
permitting voter removal in order to keep accurate voting registration
records.53 The NVRA provides a procedural guideline on how to remove
voters who have not voted or appeared in two elections for federal office. 54
For a state to remove a voter, it must comply with the notice
requirements outlined in 52 U.S.C.

§§ 20507(c) and (d).55 The statute

requires the notice to contain the following:
45. Id. at 648.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 649.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 52 U.S.C. § 20507 (2017).
52. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(b)(2) (2017) ("Any State program or activity to protect the
integrity of the electoral process . . . (2) shall not result in the removal of the name of any
person from the official list of voters registered to vote in an election for Federal office by
reason of the person's failure to vote.").
53. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(c) (2017).
54. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(b)(2).
[N]othing in this paragraph may be construed to prohibit a State from using the
procedures described in subsection (c) and (d) to remove an individual from the
official list of eligible voters if the individual ... (B) has not voted or appeared
to vote in 2 or more consecutive general elections for Federal office.

Id.
55. 52 U.S.C. §§ 20507(c)-(d) (2017).
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(1) A State may meet the requirement of subsection (a)(4) by
establishing a program under which(A) change-of-address information supplied by the Postal Service
through its licensees is used to identify registrants whose addresses
may have changed; and
(B) if it appears from information provided by the Postal Service that(i) a registrant has moved to a different residence address in the same
registrar's jurisdiction in which the registrant is currently registered,
the registrar changes the registration records to show the new address
and sends the registrant a notice of the change by forwardable mail
and a postage prepaid pre-addressed return form by which the
registrant may verify or correct the address information; or
(ii) the registrant has moved to a different residence address not in the
same registrar's jurisdiction, the registrar uses the notice procedure
described in subsection (d)(2) to confirm the change of address.
(2)(A) A State shall complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date
of a primary or general election for Federal office, any program the
purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible
56
voters from the official lists of eligible voters.
The state is deemed to have complied with the requirements to remove
a voter from voter registration rolls once a notice is sent to the voter's

last known address. 57 Therefore, under 52 U.S.C.

§ 20507(d)(1)(B),"5

when a voter fails to respond to such notice and has failed to vote or
appear in an election, the state may remove the voter from registration
rolls.59
60
The NVRA's purpose is to increase the number of voters in America.
It also seeks to create procedures for states to maintain an accurate

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. § 20507(c).
52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(1) (2017).
52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(1)(B) (2017).
52 U.S.C. §§ 20507(d)(1)(A)-(B) (2017).

A State shall not remove the name of a registrant from the official list of eligible
voters in election . . . unless the registrant-(A) confirms in writing that the
registrant has changed residence to a place outside the registrar's jurisdiction in
which the registrant is registered; or . . . (B)(ii) has not voter or appeared to
vote . .. in an election during the period beginning on the date of the notice and
ending on the day after the date of the second general election for Federal office
that occurs after the date of the notice.

Id.
60.

52 U.S.C.

§ 20501(b)

(2017) provides a purpose clause that states:
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registration roll without abridging citizens' First Amendment right not
to vote.6 1 However, while the text seemed black and white, the statute
left a gray area when it was silent on what is permissible to trigger the
removal provision.

D. Black and White Make Gray
After the NVRA passage, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, in 1994, considered Philadelphia's voter purge statute in

Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office of City Commissioners Voter
Registration Division.62 The Third Circuit upheld Philadelphia's nonvoter purge act, reasoning the purpose and effect of the act was to prevent
voter fraud. 63 The Pennsylvania law stated that "registered voters who
fail [ed] to vote for two years [should] be purged from the registration rolls
after being provided notice." 64
On October 25, 1991, Angel Ortiz, Project Vote, and Service Employees
International Union (collectively "Ortiz") challenged Philadelphia's voter
purge procedure, alleging a violation of the Voting Rights Act and the
First and Fourth Amendments by purging voters for failure to vote. Ortiz
argued that the voter purge statute infringed on the First Amendment
right not to vote and that it disproportionately targeted minorities. On
October 29, 1991, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania denied Ortiz's motion for an injunction. Almost
a year later, on October 6, 1992, Ortiz again sought to enjoin the State
from removing voters for failure to vote. Once again, the district court
denied this request. According to the district court, even though the voter
purge act disproportionality purged African-American and Latino voters,
the purge law did not deprive minority voters of equal access to the
political process, which would be a violation of the Voting Rights Act. 65
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that to prove an electoral process
deprives equal access, the petitioner needs to show a causal connection

The purposes of this Act are- (1) to establish procedures that will increase the
number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for Federal office; (2)
to make it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement this
Act in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters in
elections for Federal office; (3) to protect the integrity of the electoral process;
and (4) to ensure that accurate and current and current voter registration rolls
are maintained.

Id.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
28 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 314.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 307-08.
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between the challenged electoral practice and the potential for
discrimination resulting in the violation of the right to vote.66 The court
cited Wesley v. Collins67 in its analysis of balancing state interest and
voting laws.68 Wesley was a Tennessee case where plaintiffs argued that
a Tennessee law that did not allow convicted felons to vote had a
disproportionate effect on the black population because there were
significantly more black convicted felons than there were white convicted
felons.69 The court in Wesley held that the State had a legitimate and
compelling rationale for enacting the statute at issue, and therefore, it
was valid. 70
Relying on Wesley, the Third Circuit upheld the district court's finding
that Pennsylvania's statute removing voters for lack of voting did not
disproportionately produce discriminatory effects and lack of equal
access. 7 1 The court noted that a voter purge statute could have a

discriminatory effect if a fair procedure for the removal of voters was not
followed or if the opportunity to reregister was limited to certain people. 72
However, the court concluded that the State was not trying to prevent
minorities from voting. Rather, the court held that it was a historical fact
that minorities did not show up to vote as frequently.7 3 The court
continued to reason that "[voter] purge statutes are a legitimate means
by which the State can attempt to prevent voter fraud."7 4
In so ruling, the majority did not touch on whether the removal of
voters for failure to vote for two years violated the NVRA. However, the
concurrence did address the implications and effect the NVRA would

66. Id. at 312.
67. 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
68. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 310-11.
69. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1258.
70. Id. at 1261; see also Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 311.
71. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 311.
72. Id. at 311-12 n.6.
73. Id. at 313.
74. Id. at 314. The court referenced Hoffman, where the Fourth Circuit rejected a
challenge to a voter purge statute, stating:
The statute in question here is designed to curb vote fraud. It removes from the
registered voter list those who have moved without notifying the voter
registration board, those who have died when the city has not been notified of
such deaths, and those who have become disqualified as a result of conviction
for infamous crime. . . . Without removing the names, there exists the very real
danger that imposters will claim to be someone on the list and vote in their
places. And the absent voting statutes open the door for vote fraud by this
means. Accordingly, keeping accurate, reliable and up-to-date voter registration
lists is an important state interest.
Id. at 314 n.13 (citing Hoffman, 928 F.2d at 649).
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have on maintaining voter registration rolls. 7 5 Judge Anthony Scirica
emphasized the importance of protecting the system from voter fraud,
stating the statute was a reaction to the voter fraud in Philadelphia.76
This reaction prompted the Pennsylvania General Assembly to enact a
non-voter purge statute. Judge Scirica relied on an earlier case
interpreting the Pennsylvania voter-purge statute.7 7 Thirty-five years
after the Pennsylvania non-voter purge statute was enacted, it was
upheld in Williams v. Osser7 8 by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 79
The Williams court upheld the statute because of the interest the statute
sought to protect: the integrity of the electoral process.80 The Williams
court noted that removing names of voters who had not voted in two years
allowed the State to act preemptively in preventing political operatives
from taking advantage of the political system by removing their names
before fraud occurred.8 1
Judge Scirica noted that the concern for low voter turnout led
Congress to increase voter participation. 82 He pointed out that while
Congress was trying to strike a balance between preventing voter fraud
and increasing participation, the NVRA would actually have the effect of
making it more difficult for states to determine and purge ineligible
voters. 83 The concurrence ultimately concluded that it was up to the
legislature to make policy decisions regarding elections so long as it did
not violate the federal and state constitutions or other statutes. 84

Similarly, in A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Husted, 5 the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether voting
was a valid trigger for allowing the State to send out voter confirmation

75. See Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 318 (Scirica, J., concurring).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 350 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
79. Id. at 652.
80. Id. at 653.
81. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 318 (citing Williams, 350 F. Supp. at 652). The court in Williams
held that
[m]aintaining voter rolls that include persons who no longer reside in a precinct,
or who reside there but do not vote, conduces to fraud. Pennsylvania discovered
that political operatives knowledgeable of the status of such registrants and
weaknesses in the system were able to cast votes in the non-voters' names. The
two-year period allows removal of the names before the political operatives can
take advantage of the situation.
Williams, 350 F. Supp. at 652.
82. Ortiz, 28 F.3d at 318.
83. Id. at 318-19.
84. Id. at 319.
85. 838 F.3d 699 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2188 (2017).
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cards. 86 In 2016, the A. Philip Randolph Institute, the Northeast Ohio
Coalition for the Homeless, and Larry Harmon (collectively "the
plaintiffs") filed a suit against the Ohio Secretary of State, claiming the
Ohio voter removal procedure violated the NVRA by removing voters for
their failure to vote.87 The NVRA was little help in guiding the court's
decision. While the NVRA sought to strike a balance between the issue
of preventing voter fraud and increasing participation in elections, it
proved not to be a solid black and white line as many hoped. The Ohio
voter purge statute stated that "each county's [Board of Elections]
compile[d] a list of registered voters who have not engaged in any 'voter
activity' for two years."88 Voters on the list would be sent a confirmation
notice. If a voter failed to respond to the notice or failed to vote for four
89
years, the voter would be removed from the voter registration rolls.
Before examining the trigger provision, the Sixth Circuit looked at the
purpose for which Congress passed the NVRA.90 On this point, the court
noted that the NVRA sought "to establish procedures that [would]
increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections
for Federal office .

.

. [and] to ensure that accurate and current voter

registration rolls are maintained."9 1 The court further noted that the
statute has two conflicting purposes: increasing participation while also
making sure the lists are accurate. 92
Initially, the court began with an examination of the NVRA regarding
whether the trigger could be a voter's failure to vote in elections or have
94
no voter activity. 93 However, the NVRA is silent on this matter. The
restraints placed on states regarding the voter registration rolls reads
95
that a registered voter may not be removed by the voter's failure to vote.
The court also examined the House Report from the enactment of the
NVRA, which stated, "One of the guiding principles [of the NVRA is] to
ensure that once registered, a voter remains on the rolls so long as he or

86. Id. at 707.
87. Id. at 704. The plaintiffs also claimed the notice procedure of the Ohio statute did
not meet the standards of the NVRA. However, prior to this case coming up in court, Ohio
restructured there notice procedure. Id. at 703-04.
88. Id. at 703.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 705.

91. Id. (citing 52 U.S.C.

§ 20501(b)).

92. Id. (quoting Common Cause of Colo. v. Buescher, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1274 (D.
Colo. 2010)).
93. Id. at 706.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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she is eligible to vote in that jurisdiction."9 6 Nevertheless, the NVRA also
provides circumstances where states can remove voters, including a
change of address so that states can maintain accurate voter registration
rolls.9 7 Along with the NVRA, the court considered HAVA, which
provides that removal of voters must be done in a manner that is
consistent with the NVRA. 9 8
In the Ohio statute, the trigger provision for removal was a registrant's
failure to have any voter activity for two years. The Secretary of State
argued the safe harbor in the NVRA is read as "when coupled with,"
which would permit the failure to vote as a trigger provision if it was
coupled with notice confirmation of being removed. The State further
argued that the NVRA safe harbor provision allowed for removal if notice
was provided.99
However, the court pointed out that the NVRA did not include the
phrase "coupled with," nor would it be comparable to any language in the
safe harbor clause. 00 Therefore, if it were to take that analysis, it would
require the court to read a phrase into the statute. Instead, the court
concluded that the safe harbor provision should adhere to traditional
interpretation rules and be construed narrowly.1 01 The court decided to
give maximum effect to the general prohibiting clause.1 02 The court
concluded that "the only reasonable reading of the NVRA is that any part
of a state's roll maintenance process that does not mimic the expressly
permitted procedures outlined in subsections (c) or (d) [of the Ohio]
'trigger' provision-is subject to subsection (b)(2)'s prohibition clause." 103
Consequently, the Sixth Circuit struck down Ohio's voter purge statute
for violating the NVRA.104
In so ruling, the court reasoned that the Ohio statute used a person's
failure to vote explicitly as the trigger to send out voter confirmation
cards.105 If a trigger provision was based on a voter's failure, the NVRA
prohibition clause would be unnecessary. 106 The court concluded that
regardless of whether the Ohio statute adhered to the NVRA removal

96. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 103-9, at 18 (1993)).

97. Id.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

708.

710.
712.
710.
711.
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requirements, the trigger used to place a voter on the list for confirmation
would send smoke to the NVRA's purpose if it was based on a voter's
failure to vote.107 Ohio appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, and
08
its petition was granted.
Circuit Judge Eugene Siler, Jr. concurred in part and dissented in
part. 109 Judge Siler pointed out that the majority's analysis of the NVRA
missed the subsection that allows a state to use removal procedures to
remove an individual from the list if a voter has not appeared to vote in
10
two or more consecutive elections for federal office.1 Judge Siler noted
that a voter is not automatically removed because of a failure to vote."
Rather, non-voters were placed on the inactive list and were removed
2
after four years of continually failing to vote.11 Thus, Judge Siler stated
that the Ohio non-voter removal statute was not in violation of the
NVRA.113 Rather, it was a reasonable effort made by the State to carry
out the NVRA mandate to maintain an accurate voter registration list. 114
Judge Siler further noted that a State cannot remove a registered
voter from the list solely for failure to vote." 5 However, Ohio did not
remove registered voters solely on the basis of failure to vote; instead, it
removed registrants "only if (1) they [had] not voted or updated their
registration for the last two years, (2) also failed to respond to the
address-confirmation notice, and (3) then failed to engage in any voter
activity in four consecutive years, including two consecutive Federal
elections following that notice."" 6 Judge Siler further noted that the
district court correctly pointed to language in HAVA that allowed a State
to remove a voter for failure to respond to the notice and who had not
voted.11 7 He concluded that the statute left it up to the states to
implement the NVRA and HAVA, and Ohio's procedure did not infringe
on the safeguards provided in the NVRA by its trigger provision because
Ohio did not remove voters solely because they failed to vote, but rather,

107. Id.
108. Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 137 S. Ct. 2188 (2017).
109. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 838 F.3d at 716 (Siler, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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for a three-part failure.118 Not voting was the trigger; however,
continuously failing to respond was the smoke.119

E. Georgia'sRegistrationof Voters Statute Enters the Gray Zone
In 1994, Georgia enacted a voter purge statute that set out the
procedure for the removal of voters from voter registration lists.1 20
0.C.G.A. § 21-2-234 sets out the removal procedure for voters who fail to
have contact with the electoral system. 121 Under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234,
Georgia's Secretary of State sends out voter confirmation cards to
registered voters who have had "no contact" with the electorate system
in three years. 122 Each letter contains a return envelope.123 If the voter
fails to confirm in thirty days, the voter is moved to the inactive list of
the voter registry. 124 Inactive status does not mean that the voter is no
longer eligible to vote. However, if the voter remains without contact for
two additional years, the voter then becomes ineligible to vote and must
reregister.125
Once an elector is identified as having no contact, mail notification is
sent to confirm the identified address. 126 If the elector returns the card
and confirms a change in address, the registrations rolls are updated and
a new card will be sent out, if within the state of Georgia. 127 If the elector
fails to return the card within thirty days, the elector will be transferred
to the voter inactive list. 128
IV. CoURT's RATIONALE

In Common Cause v. Kemp, Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp
moved to dismiss the case, arguing Georgia's voter-purge statute does not
violate the NVRA or voters' First Amendment right.129 The issue before
the court was whether Georgia's removal statute removed voters for not
voting.130 Judge Timothy C. Batten, sitting as the judge for the United

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Ga. H.R. Bill 1207 § 3.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234(a)(1) (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234(c) (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234.
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-235 (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234(b) (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234(d) (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234(g) (2017).
Common Cause, 243 F. Supp. 3d at 1316.
Id. at 1320.
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States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, granted
131
Secretary of State Kemp's motion to dismiss. The court expressly noted
that the Georgia notice provision and the language in the removal statute
32
"closely mirror [ed] the language of the NVRA."1
In dismissing the case, the court considered the language in the
NVRA, finding the statute was silent regarding a trigger provision. The
court noted that "[t]he NVRA is silent on when and how a state may
decide to send out the notifications. Other than the exemplar safe-harbor
provision, there is no explicit statutory language governing 'trigger'
provisions." 133 The court concluded that the NVRA's silence gave states
34
permission to use any trigger method.1
Next, the court held that Common Cause and the NAACP argument
that the Georgia removal statute was not applied uniformly was factually
inaccurate. 135 Common Cause and the NAACP claimed the removal
statute was not applied uniformly because it only targeted those who did
not vote.13 6 According to the court, the argument was factually inaccurate
because the voter-removal program began with the entire population of
Georgia voters, and then the same removal procedures were applied to
37
each voter equally.1
The court then addressed the concerns the United States brought up
38
in its note supporting the plaintiffs.1 The United States argued that
additional requirements regarding the type of information a state can
39
send out must be based on objective and reliable information. The court
pointed out, however, that the NVRA and HAVA were silent on any
140
Because
additional requirements of objective or reliable information.
sending
triggering
requirements
the
the NVRA and HAVA were silent on
law as
the
uphold
to
is
role
[c]ourt's
out information to voters, "[t]he
1
the
Therefore,
law."14
written, not to usurp Congress's role in writing the

131. Id. at 1324.
132. Id. at 1320. Judge Batten notes that there is a "dearth of caselaw" on the issue of
trigger provision, stating he was only aware of A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Husted. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.; see also id. at 1320 n.4 ("The language of the safe-harbor provision is
permissive, not exclusive, meaning states may permissibly use other trigger methods.").
135. Id. at 1321.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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court would not read that requirement into the statute because Congress
had not placed it there. 142
The court concluded that voters are not removed because of their
failure to vote. Rather, the Georgia statute removes voters due to their
failure to respond and for continuously having no contact with the
electoral process after being placed on the inactive list.143 The NVRA did
not prohibit states from "ever considering a person's failure to vote when
removing ineligible voters ... and the NVRA's removal process explicitly
references a voter's failure to 'vote."' 144 The court also relied on HAVA as
supporting Georgia's removal procedure. 145 The court concluded HAVA
prohibited the states from removing voters "solely by reason of a failure

to

vote."146

Lastly, the court dismissed Common Cause and the NAACP's claim
that the Georgia voter removal procedure violated voters' First
Amendment rights to express themselves by not voting.14 7 The court
noted that the Georgia statute did not compel anyone to vote, and the
simple failure not to vote did not remove a voter from the registration
rolls. 148 Regardless, the court ruled the maintenance of accurate voter

registration rolls "is a substantial governmental interest, as mandated
under the NVRA and HAVA."149
V. IMPLICATIONS

Voters' rights, especially the right not to vote, hinges on the Supreme
Court of the United States' interpretation of "reasonable" and "solely".
The Supreme Court is now attempting to clear the gray area left by
Congress's silence in the NVRA regarding trigger provisions for the
confirmation clause. As Justice Samuel Alito said during oral arguments
for Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, the question before the Court
is not one of public policy or what Congress should have done, it is a
question of statutory interpretation. 180 However, it is hard to ignore the

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(4)(A) (2017) and concluding
that the Georgia removal statute closely mirrored the language in NVRA and HAVA and
did not violate either federal statute).
147. Id. at 1322.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1323.
150. Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Husted v. Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst., 137 S.
Ct. 2188 (2017) (No. 16-988).
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purpose for which Congress enacted the statute: to make it easier for
citizens to vote. While that was a main concern, Congress also made sure
to place provisions in the statute that protect states' ability to remove
voters from registration rolls to keep accurate lists and reduce voter
fraud.
Congress did not enact the clearest statute, which is why there is no
black and white answer. Indeed, in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the
United States, the Solicitor General noted that the NVRA was not the
15 1
The confusion was
best example of congressional draftsmanship.
further compounded when the United States changed positions after its
initial misreading of the statute. When the case was before the Sixth
Circuit, the United States filed an amicus brief in support of A. Philip
Randolph Institute stating that Ohio's purge statute violated the
NVRA.15 2 Nevertheless, when Husted appealed to the Supreme Court,
the United States changed its position claiming it misinterpreted the
statute and that it did not, in fact, violate the NVRA.153
Justice Ginsburg was shocked at this turn of events and specifically
asked the Solicitor General about the departure from their long-standing
position. 154 The Solicitor General claimed the government's change in
15 5
The branch
position was due to its initial misreading of the statute.
charged with executing the NVRA misread the statute, exemplifying the
murky, muddled mess where Congress placed citizens' voting rights.
More importantly, this subpar draftsmanship will affect the lives of
millions of Americans and the meaning of the NVRA. In 2017, Georgia's
Secretary of State Office reported that it sent 383,487 confirmation

151. Id. at 35.
152. United States Amicus Brief for Appellants, Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v.
Husted, 838 F.3d 699 (6th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-3746), 2016 WL 3923034, at *8. "[T]riggering
the confirmation process based solely on voter inactivity . . . inevitably results in the
removal of voters based on non-voting, which violates the NVRA and HAVA." Id.
153. United States Amicus Brief for Petitioners, Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 137
S. Ct. 2188 (2017) (No. 16-3746), 2017 WL 3485554, at *10. "Ohio and several other States
have long used registrant's failure to vote for specified period of years as grounds for
sending an address-verification notice under [NVRA notice confirmation clause]. That
practice does not violate the NVRA." Id.
154. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Husted v. Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst., 137 S.
Ct. 2188 (2017) (No. 16-988).
155. Id. at 31-32.
Our prior position was based on an understanding of the statute that read into
it a reliable evidence requirement, and we said that non-voting was not that kind
of reliable evidence. [The United States'] current position is that when you look
at the statute, there's simply no way to read into it a reliable evidence
requirement that's found nowhere in the text.
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notices out as part of the state's normal voter maintenance provisions. 156
Depending on the interpretation of "silence," the number of voters sent a
notification could become a slippery slope to the disenfranchisement of
thousands of Georgia voters.
If the Supreme Court sides with Husted, the Northern District of
Georgia's interpretation of NVRA would appear to be accurate:
Congress's silence cannot be read to prohibit states from using non-voting
as a trigger to send a confirmation notice. This would mean that Congress
only meant that voters could not be removed solely because of failing to
vote, and the confirmation provision is to be read separately. The
confirmation of the voter registration does state that a voter cannot be
removed from the list for a failure to vote, but Congress added the
language that nothing in that paragraph should be construed to prohibit
states from sending out notice confirmations pursuant to the statute.
From the text of the statute, it is clear a state cannot use failure to vote
to directly purge a voter.
However, the question is whether there is supposed to be an implied
"solely" read into the statute. 15 7 The Northern District of Georgia said it
was not going to put words in the statute that Congress did not place
there, which is why it held Georgia's statute did not violate the NVRA. 158
If the Supreme Court applies the plain meaning of the text and Congress
does not make an attempt to change the statute, Congress will impliedly
consent that it did not intend for the failure to vote not to be a trigger,
but rather, that it did not want to infringe on states' ability to maintain
accurate voting rolls. If the Court were to take the textualist approach in
its Husted decision, the Northern District of Georgia will affirm its
decision for the State and Georgia's current voter purge statute. This
ruling will recognize that Congress's silence was intended to allow states
to purge voters as long as they complied with the confirmation clause.

156. Sam Levine, ACLU ThreatensActions Against Georgia Voter ConfirmationNotices,
HUFFINGTON PosT (July 26, 2017, 9:53 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.comlentry/
georgia-voter-purgeus_5977af30e4b0e201d5793033. This number includes any reason
that triggers a notice confirmation, not solely being sent a confirmation based on failure to
vote. Id.
157. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, Husted v. Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst.,
137.S. Ct. 2188 (2017) (No. 16-988). Justice Alito asked Eric Murphy, counsel for Ohio, why
the best interpretation of the provisions is that "one cannot be removed solely because of
failure to vote," to which Mr. Murphy replied, "That's absolutely correct." However, Justice
Kagan was not convinced. Based on the statutory cannon of expressio unius, Congress says
what it means. She pointed out that Congress uses "solely" in several other statutes where
they want it; therefore, it knows how to use the word "solely" when it wants to, and it did
not place the word "solely" here. Id. at 13.
158. Common Cause, 248 F. Supp. at 1321.
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This ruling will allow Georgia to continue to place individuals on the
confirmation list for failure to vote.
If the Supreme Court rules in favor of Ohio's voter purge statute, it.
will have particularly significant implications for underrepresented
communities. 159 Allowing states to send voter confirmation cards to
individuals who have failed to vote will create another obstacle where
160
Congress has tried to simplify the process and register more voters.
States have already enacted several statutes that have made the voting
process more cumbersome, especially for voters who are already
underrepresented by enacting stricter voter ID laws, dealing with
increasing problems with polling line lengths, and the inability to attend
early voting. 16 1 Therefore, if the Supreme Court upholds Ohio's voter
purge statute, the Northern District of Georgia will uphold Georgia's
voter purge statute, placing citizens at risk for failing to vote. While this
ruling will be based on precedent set by the Supreme Court, the Northern
District will not have recognized whether voter fraud is a true problem
162
in Georgia.
According to Congress, the purpose of the NVRA is to increase voter
registration and make the process of registering to vote easier, as well as
allowing states to keep accurate rolls.16 This stated purpose imposes a

159. Arturo Vargas, How Ohio's Voter Purge Practices Disproportionately Affect
Minorities, THE HILL (Jan. 10, 2018, 7:15 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog
/politics/368203-how-ohios-voter-purge-practices-disproportionately-affect.
160. Id. The Sixth Circuit's ruling in Husted allowed 7,500 voters in Ohio, who would
have been purged from the voter registration list, a chance to vote in the 2016 election.
161. Liz Kennedy, Voter Suppression Laws Cost Americans Their Voices at the Polls,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 11, 2016, 3:57 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues
/democracy/reports/2016/11/11/292322/voter-suppression-laws-cost-americans-their-voices
-at-the-polls/.
162. There have only been thirty-three people who were prosecuted for voter fraud.
Lorraine C. Minnite, The Politics of Voter Fraud,PROJECT VOTE, http://www.projectvote.org
/wp-content/uploads/2007/03/Politics of VoterFraudFinal.pdf (last visited Mar. 20,
2018). The number who were actually convicted is twenty-three. Id. This is twenty-three
out of billions of votes cast across America from 2002-2005. Id. Therefore, the states fear
of voter fraud is with little foundation in today's times. In a study by Brennan Center, it
was found that most voter fraud is from technology malfunctions or election officials'
FOR JUST., at 4,
misconduct. Justin Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud, BRENNAN CTR.
2
2
About% 0
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/The%20Truth%
likely
more
is
"[i]t
that
concluded
study
The
Voter%20Fraud.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
that an individual will be struck by lightning than that he will impersonate another voter
at the polls." Id.
163. National Voter Registration Act of 1993 § 2(b).
Section 2 (b) Purposes.-The purposes of this act areto establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who
register to vote in elections for Federal office;
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major problem for applying the textualist approach to the reading of the
statute. Even if the failure to vote is not the sole reason for being
discharged from the roll, it can still be seen as a punishment for
exercising a constitutional right. This not only violates the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution, but it also assists in the
malicious, systematic removal of eligible voters by unnecessarily
removing voters.1 64 If Congress does not change the text after this ruling,
the purpose of the statute will be read as protecting voters' right not to
vote, directly or indirectly, no matter what. Rather, states will have to
use other provisions, such as looking at driver registration. If the
Supreme Court applies a purposivist approach, the Northern District of
Georgia will have to rule against the state and follow the logic of the Sixth
Circuit because the purpose of the statute would be to prevent states from
purging voters for non-voting.
A ruling for the voters in Ohio would place states at a crossroads. The
NVRA recognizes states have an interest in maintaining accurate voter
registration rolls. States have enacted statutes like Georgia's and Ohio's
to maintain accurate registration rolls by purging voters who have moved
or are deceased. States that have implemented a statute will have to
change their statutes. While this will protect individuals who choose not
to vote, it creates a more cumbersome process for maintaining voter
registration integrity. 65 This integrity reduces voter fraud from
occurring at the polls and has been an important goal of all states in
elections. There is nothing to expressly indicate this is a one-party
move. 6 6 Voters and states have an interest in the integrity of its voting
system, regardless of party affiliation.
to make it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement this
Act in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters in
elections for Federal office; to protect the integrity of the electoral process; and
to ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.

Id.
164. Steve Barber, Jim Halpert, Mimi Wright & Frank Litwin, The Purging of
Empowerment: Voter Purge Laws And The Voting Rights Act, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
483, 483 (1988). "[Plurge laws potentially thwart political participation and place a
particularly disproportionate burden on minority voters. The discriminatory impact of
these laws becomes clear when examined within the sociopolical context of their application
to black Americans." Id.
165. A handful of states have purge statutes based on individual's failure to vote. Andy
Sullivan & Grant Smith, Use it or lose it: Occasional Ohio Voters May Be Shut Out in
November, REUTERS (June 2, 2016, 7:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-vot
ingrights-ohio-insight/use-it-or-lose-it-occasional-ohio-voters-may-be-shut-out-in-novem

ber-idUSKCNOYO19D.
166. "Unlike other voting-rights disputes ...
[purging statutes do not] appear to be
driven by one specific party. Both Republican and Democrat officials have purged inactive
voters." Id. (commenting on the Ohio voter purge statute). However, in Georgia, the court's
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There is nothing clear in this murky gray language of the statute.
When the Supreme Court publishes its opinion in Husted, states will
have guidelines regarding the interpretation of the NVRA trigger
provision. While states will have to follow the Supreme Court's
guidelines, nothing is ever as clear as it seems. Congress left silence
within the statute, and now the judicial branch must seek to determine
what terms, such as "reasonable," mean within the context of evidence
for failure to move and what Congress intended by leaving out the word
"solely." As Justice Alito stated, there are good policy reasons for either
decision, but the Court must interpret the language Congress has
written. 167 If Congress remains silent after the Supreme Court's ruling,
this will create a strong stare decisis for any other issue arising under
this provision of the statute. It is left to be decided whether the gray mess
of NVRA will be brightened into a new line or darkened. A new bright
line will not come until Congress speaks or chooses to remain silent, yet
again.
Caitlin Wise

decision smells more like a political decision in attempting to keep Georgia a red state. In
an article for PolitiFact Georgia, Andra Gillespie, a political science professor at Emory
University, state voter fraud is not widespread in the United States. Rather, the issue of
voter fraud comes down to the difference in how the Democratic Party and Republican Party
see voting. Democrats favor a more open system that provides easier access. Republicans
favor a more skeptical system, which requires preparation prior to election day. Ariella
Philips, Ga. Election Official Off Base on Voting Interference, POLITIFACT GEORGIA,
http://www.politifact.com.georgialstatements/2016/oct/29/brian-kemp/ga-election-officialbase-election-interfere nce/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2018).
167. In an article written for SCOTUSblog, Amy Howe talks about the direction the
Supreme Court justices appeared to be heading in after hearing oral arguments. She noted
that Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, two of the more conservative justices, did not ask any
questions. However, "[i]f Thomas and Gorsuch follow the direction in which Roberts,
Kennedy and Alito appear to be heading, Breyer's vote may not make a difference anyway."
Amy Howe, Argument analysis: Ohio voter-registrationpracticessafe?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan.
10, 2018, 4:47 PVI), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/01/argument-analysis-ohio-voter-regis
tration-practices-safel. From the oral arguments, it appears that Justices Roberts,
Kennedy, and Alito are more likely to side with the State due to Congress's failure to
expressly say not voting could not be a trigger for notification. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 3, 4, 12, 34, 38, 39, 40, 41, 49, 54 & 55, Husted v. Ohio A. Philip Randolph
Inst., 137 S. Ct. 2188 (2017) (No. 16-988).
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